TRANSCRIPTION of ACTION REPORT

for

U.S.S. SHERIDAN - APA51

Saipan Operation

15 June - 22 June 1944

This document was transcribed from copy of declassified original action report, which was printed from National Archives microfilm records.

The original typewritten documents (35 pages which follow) were copied verbatim, as nearly as possible (including punctuation, spacing, capitalization, spelling, line breaks, etc.)

```
title page
Pages 1-22
              C.O. report
                                       Mockrish
Enclosure A(1-4)
                   Table of assignments of boat teams
                   (first and second loads)
Enclosure A-5 Diagram of Debarkation Plan
Enclosure A-6 List of boat assignments/diagram of holding area
Enclosure B-1 List of troops aboard
Enclosure B-2 Cargo Report
Enclosure B-3 Diagram of cargo in holds
Enclosure C Map of beach designations, Saipan and Tinian
Enclosure D
              X.O. report
                                       Ingram
```

Transcribed by John Clingman

Info:

15 June to 21 June 1944 : Arrived Saipan and landed 1312 personnel and 557.4 tons of equipment of 2nd Battalion, 6th Regiment, 2nd Marine Division, in assault on Beach Red II. Received aboard and cared for two hundred and forty-five (245) casualties, and in addition eight casualties (two dead and six wounded) of the ship's beach party. Operation conducted under CTF 52.

ACTION REPORT

DECLASSIFIED (previously CONFIDENTIAL)

USS SHERIDAN APA 51

SERIAL 034 25 JUNE 1944

U.S.S. SHERIDAN – SAIPAN OPERATION – REPORT OF.

COVERS ASSAULT AND INITIAL LANDINGS ON SAIPAN FROM 15-22 JUNE 1944, FOR FORAGER OPERATION. IN TASK UNIT 52.3.3.

139341

(stamp) OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

APA51/A16-3/A9 Serial No. 034.	U.S.S. SHERIDAN c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944
From: To : Via :	 The Commanding Officer. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. (1) The Commander Transport Division TWENTY-EIGHT. (2) The Commander Transport Group ABLE. (3) The Administrative Commander, FIFTH Amphibious Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. (4) The Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject:	U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.
Reference:	(a) Article 712, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.(b) Article 874(6), U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.
Enclosures:	 (A) Debarkation Schedule. (handwritten p.23) (B) Summary of Cargo and Troops embarked on board.(p.29) (C) Landing Diagram. (handwritten p.32) (D) Report of Executive Officer (handwritten p.33)

I. NARRATIVE:

1. Upon receipt of the Administrative Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force's dispatch, 162037 of February 1944, reported to the Commander Transport Division TWENTY-EIGHT, and on 7 May 1944 proceeded to Hilo, Hawaii and embarked units of LT 2/6 plus various special units and loaded U.S. Marine Corps equipment, cargo and personnel. This ship on 10 May 1944 with Transport Division TWENTY-EIGHT proceeded to Honolulu, T.H.

2. On 14 May 1944 - in accordance with commander Task Force FIFTY-TWO Training Order No. A13-44, the U.S.S. SHERIDAN in company with Transport Division TWENTY-EIGHT proceded out of Honolulu Harbor to Lahaina Roads, Maui, T.H., and in subsequent days conducted practice operations in Maalaea Bay, Maui, and off Kahoolawe Island. Completed practice operations on 19 May 1944, and in accordance with Commander Task Force FIFTY-TWO serial 00072 proceeded in company with the U.S.S. CAMBRIA, O.T.C., and Task Groups FIFTY-TWO point FIFTEEN and FIFTY-TWO point SIXTEEN to Pearl Harbor, T.H.

3. On 30 May 1944 - in accordance with Commander Task Group's FIFTY-TWO point SIXTEEN Movement Order No. A108-44 departed Pearl Harbor, T.H., and proceeded in company with the U.S.S. CAMBRIA O.T.C., and Transport Group ABLE to Eniwetok. While enroute daily gunnery and ship handling exercises were Held as ordered by Commander Task Group FIFTY-TWO point SIXTEEN.

-1-

(stamp) 139341 **FILMED**

(stamp) **11 03037**

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944 Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

I. NARRATIVE_(Cont'd)

Surface and air search radar tracking exercises were conducted as ordered, and instructions were given to all officers (Navy and Marine) and boat crews in phases of amphibious operations.

4. Task Group FIFTY-TWO point SIXTEEN arrived at the staging area (ENIWETOK) on 9 June 1944, and effected final transfer of personnel to LST's, fueled and provisioned to capacity.

5. On 11 June 1944 - the SHERIDAN departed ENIWETOK in company with Task Group FIFTY-TWO point SIXTEEN for SAIPAN, MARIANAS ISLANDS.

6. On 13 June 1944 - the destroyer escorts were fueled at sea, the SHERIDAN fueling the APD 6.

7. On 14 June 1944 - transports groups ABLE and BAKER joined and formed the Demonstration Group and Advance Group then proceeded along the approach route to the Transport Areas on D-Day.

8. On D-DAY - 15 June 1944 - the SHERIDAN arrived in position in Transport Area Number One at 0525, and at 0533 commenced lowering all boats in the water, all davit boats were rail loaded with assault troops, or with control personnel to be sent to their various assignments as guide on control boats. At 0900 proceeded into Transport Area Number Three and maintained station on the U.S.S. MONROVIA and the U.S.S. BOLIVAR, discharging priority cargo as called for by the control vessel at Red Beach Two. At 1800 got underway and proceeded from Transport Area along retirement route BLUE for the night. At 1850 four (4) enemy planes were sighted crossing the course of the formation. This vessel was able to fire only one round of 5"/38 as they quickly passed out of range.

9. On 16 June 1944 - while returning to the Transport Area, sixteen (16) unidentified planes were reported approaching the formation, two of them flying over were fired on by nearly all ships in group, and one plane was shot down. These planes were later identified as friendly. At 0725 anchored in Transport Area Number Three and commenced discharging priority cargo as called for by control vessel at Red Beach Two. At 0802 LST 450 came alongside and commenced transferring casualties to this vessel. During the day, two hundred and forty-five casualties were received on board and the bodies of twelve (12) deceased

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

II. NARRATIVE__(Cont'd)

were buried at sea. At 1819 this vessel got underway in company with Commander Transport Group ABLE and proceeded on retirement route WHITE ONE for the night.

10. On 17 June 1944 - at 0620 arrived in Transport Area Number Three. Lowered all boats and commenced discharging cargo as called for by control vessel at Red Beach Two. At 1655 got underway in company with Commander Transport Group ABLE and proceded along retirement route ORANGE for the night.

11. On 18 June 1944 - at 0800 arrived in the fueling area after first going alongside the U.S.S. MONONGAHELA (AO42), which was ordered away, this vessel was finally fueled from the U.S.S. SCHUYLKILL (AO76), commencing at 1023 and finishing at 1140, receiving 100,000 gallons of fuel.

12. On 19 June 1944 - in accordance with Commander Task Group's FIFTY-ONE point EIGHTEEN dispatch 1625 of 19 June, the SHERIDAN in company with Commander Transport Division THIRTY-TWO, U.S.S. FREMONT, and various units of Transport Group ABLE left the formation and proceeded along route PINK to Transport Area.

13. On 20 June 1944 - at 0701 arrived in Transport Area Number Three. Commenced general unloading and debarkation of units remaining on board. At 1950 all marines, except casualties had left the ship and at 2327 completed discharging all marine cargo and equipment. In accordance with Commander Task Group's FIFTY-TWO point TWO dispatch, 201100K of June, the ship left twenty-five (25) boats, four (4) officers, and eighty-one (81) enlisted men for duty with Force Control Officer.

14. On 21 June 1944 - got underway in accordance with Commander Task Group's FIFTY-TWO point TWO dispatch, 210510K of June 1944, in company with U.S.S. HARRIS and various units of U.S. Fleet, proceeded to join Transport Group ABLE, Upon reporting to Commander Task Force FIFTY-TWO the U.S.S. HARRIS, with Commander Transport Division THIRTY-TWO, embarked, U.S.S. SHERIDAN, U.S.S. HEYWOOD, and U.S.S. WINGED ARROW were ordered to proceed to ENIWETOK.

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

II. EMBARKATION:

1. The troops aboard the U.S.S. SHERIDAN were composed of staff elements, artillery units, tank units, and medical units. They were divided into sixty-four (64) boat teams of which twentyfour (24) teams were scheduled to be boated immediately upon arrival in the Transport Area, the remainder were to be boated upon call. See also page 3 of enclosure (B).

III. REHEARSALS AND DRILLS ENROUTE:

1. Several debarkation drills were held. Each team was called to the debarkation station to which it would normally go on D-DAY. Approximately one (1) hour was required for each drill, and since these were experienced troops no difficulties arose. During one of the drills the ship attempted to use marine runners to call the teams to their stations. This was attempted to insure a stand by means of getting teams to their debarkation stations in case the P.A. system failed. In this case we reverted to the P.A. system but in future operations the Commanding Officer believes the ship should have drills in some such secondary method.

IV. ARRIVAL IN TRANSPORT AREA - DEBARKATION:

1. Upon arrival in Transport Area on D-DAY, twentyfour (24) boat teams were rail-loaded and were lowered away on time. The remainder of the teams were called away and no difficulties arose during the entire operation. Cooperation of Marine and Naval Personnel was outstanding.

V. CARGO DISCHARGE:

1. All cargo and vehicles were discharged according to priority and when called for by the control vessel at Red Beach Two. Slight delays were experienced in casting off tracked vehicles after they had been landed in LCM(3)'s, because it was necessary to thread slings through the suspension units and under the frames. This delay could be entirely eliminated if these vehicles were provided with hoisting pad-eyes welded to the frames (or outside of the hulls of tanks).

2. Boat allocation during the priority phase of unloading was very satisfactory and no delays were experienced, due to a shortage of boats. During the general unloading phase the use of LCT's would have expedited unloading. Unloading was completed seven hours prior to departure. See also enclosure (B).

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

V. CARGO DISCHARGE (cont'd)

3. Cargo and boat handling gear stood up very well during the operation than during maneuvers. The reason being that they received less usage at these times. There were no material casualties affecting the discharge of troops or cargo.

4. As usual the lifebelt situation remains acute. No blame or censure is directed to the Beach Party for failure to return belts to the ship from the beaches, as it is realized that they were fully occupied by more important duties at the time. It is recommended that this vessels allowance of lifebelts be increased to a total of the authorized complement of troops carried, plus 125%. This would amount to approximately 3340 belts and would enable this ship to care for any emergency which might arise, such as, reeembarkation of troops or casualties on leaving area.

VI. NAVAL PLATOON OF SHORE PARTY:

1. The Beach Party participated in the SAIPAN operation according to plan and functioned with LT 2/6 of CT 2, 2^{nd} Marine Division.

2. The Advance Echelon left the ship at ENIWETOK and boarded LST 451 on 11 June 1944. That group was boated and landed with the Fourth Assault Wave of Marines on D-DAY at 0900 near Red Beach Two in LVT's.

3. The remainder of the group was boated at about 0630 on D-DAY and was landed shortly after 1400 near Red Beach Two after having been transferred to LVT's.

4. Each group took with it all necessary organizational equipment, and also according to plan the Beach Party Medical Officer and four corpsmen remained in a special boat off the beach to treat casualties, at the transfer point, at the reef.

5. The Advance Element in the Fourth Wave landed under heavy fire from the enemy and were forced to dig in immediately upon hitting the beach. This group lost one part of its SCR 610 radio and its multi-purpose signal light. It had communication initially through the TBY radio carried by the Shore Party Liason Officer. However, 610 communication was established very shortly by use of the set brought in by the Advance Element of the Beach Party of the U.S.S. BOLIVAR. This latter

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

VI. NAVAL PLATOON OF SHORE PARTY (cont'd)

group was landed on Red Beach Three which was not used at all on D-DAY as far as it was known. Once the communications were set up they were constantly maintained from the beach to all Control Vessels.

6. The fighting was very heavy in this section and the Beach Party group was able to do little else than observe the progress of LVT's and endeavor to learn the hydrography and terrain in this manner.

7. The remainder of the Beach Party landed slightly to the north of the Advance Element and also under heavy fire from the enemy. Several of the LVT's carrying the Shore and Beach Party narrowly escaped being hit and at least one capsized by the surf. However, the Naval Group reached the beach safely with most of its equipment. As soon as the beach was gained the LVT's were hastily unloaded and sent off as all hands "dug in."

8. During that afternoon and night there was little that the Naval unit could do in its normal assigned tasks. The fighting was too heavy to permit men to be used in the water and there was no boat traffic. However, excellent communication were maintained both by radio and visual means and the medical functions were properly performed. The whole group was active in aiding and establishing the beach head, unloading LVT's on the beach and in the dumps, and carried casualties from the lines to the beach besides doing any part of their assigned task when possible.

9. On D-DAY plus 1 - more work was accomplished. Communications were continued and spare parts, sets and batteries received. Many LVT's were unloaded. Some hydrographic reconnaissance was made and results reported to the Transport Group ABLE Beachmaster. Buoys were placed off the beach at points where the most likely channel appeared. During the afternoon on rising tide boats were received on the right flank and unloaded. The Beach Part obtained information concerning the channels and Also unloading many of the boats.

10. The night of D-DAY plus 1 - was similar to the night before. The beach was under constant fire and little could be done, except in communications, and collection and treating of wounded.

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

VII. WITHDRAWAL:

1. On D-DAY plus 2 - this ship's Beach Party was relieved by the U.S.S. DOYEN's Beach Party. The ship's Beachmaster remained with the new Beach Party until they were thoroughly familiarized with the existing situation.

VIII. COMMUNICATIONS:

1. The problem of efficiency of communications, so difficult to achieve in so vast an operation, was primarily solved by the Communication Plan itself. The plan left little to be desired in thoroughness of preparation. The only deficiencies noted in the plan by this are as follows:

> Marine unit call signs and changes and additions thereto, reached the attention of ship, and in some cases marine communication officers themselves, by most haphazard methods. Changes were made in important call signs with no official notification to ships concerned. Some corrections to CentCom TWO were received by word of mouth from marine officers who had in turn received notification by word of mouth; consequently they could not be sure of the authenticity of the correction. In one instance a Jasco Communication Officer was unaware of a change in the call of his own landing team commander until a short time before he landed. Closer liaison between naval and marine communicators is still apparently required.

> One marine artillery frequency which was being guarded aboard this ship by units of the rear echelon, was so close to the TBS frequency as to effectively blank out the TBS. Blanking out was only experienced when transmissions were made from the set aboard ship. Transmissions from the beach and from other ships caused no interference.

2. The SCR 608/610 combination again proved highly satisfactory for boat control and ship to shore communications. Initially this ship guarded the boat control channel on a 608 and the Trans. Group ABLE command channel on an 808. The 608 went out of commission on D-Day plus 1 necessitating a shift of the boat control channel to the remaining receiver on the 808. Both channels were in constant use, but little difficulty was experienced in receiving necessary traffic.

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

VIII. COMMUNICATIONS: (cont'd)

3. Circuit discipline on 608/610 nets was maintained fairly well in the early stages of the operation. However, it was almost completely abandonded after the first two days. This situation can only be corrected by thoroughness in training and by individual ship communication officers exercising rigid control over operators. Net control stations have not been able to enforce the strict discipline requisite to an effective operation of these nets.

4. The ship to shore administrative net functioned smoothly and without the congestion so prevalent in past operations. Net control by the logistical control officer, as practiced in this operation, is the only means of saving this circuit from hopeless confusion.

5. Visual channels of communication were not utilized to the extent to which they are capable. Some of the tremendous overload on voice circuits could be drained off by routing more traffic to the signal bridge.

IX. ORDNANCE:

1. 20 mm and 1.1/75 guns participated in firing practices on 31 May, and 1, 2, 3, 4 June. The target was a towed sleeve, and all runs were AA modified Tare.

2. On 2 June 1944 - forward and after 5"/38 caliber guns fired at bursts and starshells in conjunction with other ships of the convoy. The practice was conducted with a regular condition three gun crew at the forward gun, and with a general quarters crew at the after gun. Fuse setting in some instances were given from Fire Control, by the Gunnery Officer, and in other instances were determined by the battery officer in-charge of the gun crew.

3. In addition to the actual firing practices the daily general quarters period was utilized for instruction at each gun. This consisted of tracking all aircraft within range, and of instruction under the officer-in-charge of the battery on the use of the Mark 14 sight. Speed drills in uncovering, cocking, and loading the 20mm guns were conducted on a competitive basis among the crews frequently. Drill on the 1.1/75 guns consisted of tracking all aircraft within range, and intensive loading

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

IX. ORDNANCE:(cont'd)

drills. Crews of the 5"/38 guns were drilled in tracking loading (with dummy powder and projectiles), and in estimating ranges, sightsettings, and fuse settings, all of which were checked by the Fire Control Officer.

4. The following ammunition was expended for practice:

20mm - 1905 rounds 1.1/75 - 1189 rounds. 5"/38 - 23 rounds (target), 1 round (service) 4 rounds (star shell).

5. The performance of ordnance equipment during practices were excellent. The only deficiencies noted were an occasional stoppage of the barrel of the 1.1/75 guns, but at no time did the whole gun fail to fire. Performance of the ammunition was perfect. More firing practices would help the aim of gunners. It is recommended crews be permitted to fire at shore installations.

6. On 15 June 1944 - during an evening red alert, one round on MK 32 (magnetic) ammunition was fired at an enemy plane by the after 5"/38 gun. A hit was not observed.

7. On 16 June 1944 - during morning general quarters, five (5) 20mm guns and two (2) 1.1/75 guns fired without order at aircraft thought to be enemy, but later identified as friendly. There were no hits.

8. The fire control aboard this ship is by sound power telephones to all batteries, from the Fire Control Station, on the after part of the Signal Bridge. The Gunnery Officer and Assisstant Gunnery Officer have their battle stations at this point, and divide the control of the guns between them.

9. There were no casualties to the ordnance equipment during the entire operation.

10. There was no gunfire support from this vessel during the operation.

X. DAMAGE:

1. No damage to this ship was sustained by enemy fire, and no hits to enemy surface craft, aircraft or installations are claimed.

C-O-N-F-I-D-J-N-T-I-A-L:

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

10

Subject: U.S.3. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

. .

U.S.S. SHERIDAN

. XI. MEDICAL:

1. On D-DAY the medical department made final proparations by setting up the after and forward battle dressing stations, main operating room and dressing room. The troop officer's wardroom was set up as a clearing station through which patients passed and injuries evacuated and sent to the specified dressing station. The after battle dressing station was designated for the treatment of fractures. The x-ray machine was placed there. The forward battle dressing station was used for the less seriously injured who could wait for treatment until the more seriously injured had been cared for. The injured requiring urgent treatment were placed in the main and isolation ward. Tetanus tomeid and sulfathiazole were given routinely. All men were x-rayed when indicated, and fifty units of plasma were given and fortyseven blood transfusions.

2. On D-DAY plus 1 - we received our first casualties via LST 450 at 0600. There were one hundred and seven from the LST and at the same time we received additional casualties from small boats which came alongside. The total number received this day was one hundred and sixty (160). The men who were received on board had been wounded twenty-four (24) to thirty-six (36) hours before being received. These men still had the original battle dressings which had been acquired on the beach. The first consideration was given to the treatment of shock. Plasma was given accordingly. Abdominal wounds were treated first. Head and chest wounds were treated and the patients put to bed and treated expectantly. A total of two hundred and sixty (260) casualties were received in the Transport Area within five (5) days.

3. All wounds were treated by the open method; washed with soap and water, irrigated, debrided and dressed with sulfa dressings. Rubber drains or sulfa cintment gause wicks were inserted in puncture wounds,

4. All compound fractures were cleansed, irrigated, debrided, locsely packed with sulfa cintment gause, and placed in plaster casts. Due to the length of time which had elapsed from the time these mon were wounded and seen by us thirteen (13) cases of gas bacillus infection developed. When the first evidence of gas bacillus was recognized the patients were immediately put on gas bacillus anti-toxin therapy, combined with sulfa compounds I.V. and orally. Smears were taken and in half of the cases the smear was found positive for gas bacillus spores and bacilli cultures. Two cases necessitated the amputation of arms and one

-10-

U.S.S. SHERIDAN c/o Fleet Post Crfice San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

XI. MEDICAL: (cont'd)

required the amputation of the leg below the knee. The remaining cases have responded to treatment by incision and drainage.

The hospital facilities aboard include the operating room, dressing room sixteen (16) beds in the main ward and six (6) in the isolation wara. The romainder of the patients were placed in bunks in the troop compartments in the areas of the after and forward battle drossing stations. On this operation we had four modical officers attached to the ship. One of whom is in the beach party and not available for duty at the time the first casualties were brought on board. There were three medical officers on board as passengers who helped with the casualties. These officers were available until D-DAY plus 5 at which time they went ashore. One doctor came aboard for neurological consultation and was assigned to this vessel for temporary duty at our request. There were thirty hospital corpsmen attached to this ship, eight of whom comprise the beach party. Of the twenty-two (22) remain-ing on board one was not available for duty due to previous injury, Tho beach party returned about noon D-DAY plus 2. One of the beach party corpsmen was wounded in the chest and died D-DAY plus 3.

6. There were two hundred and sixty (260) casualties received from the beach at SAIPAN. We received one hundred and sixty-nine (169) from the U.S.S. HARRIS at ENIMETOK and transferred thirty-six (36) white casualties to the U.S.S. HARRIS, at the same time. There were twenty-four (24) buriels from this vessel, twelve (12) arriving on board dead and twelve (12) dying on board. The total casualties on board this date are three hundred and eighty-six (386). (Three on the critical list).

XII BEACH PARTY: (Medical Section)

1. The Beach Party debarked at 0600 D-DAY in tow (2) sections, one of which landed on Red Beach Two at 1500, and one of which operated from an LCC and LCVP off the reef, until nightfall. About one hundred and seventy-five (175) casualties were evacuated from the beach, reef and LVT's in the water on D-DAY. At 0800 on D-DAY plus 1 the two (2) soctions rejoined on Red Beach Two, and were later joined by the Red Beach Three Beach Party Unit in conjunction with which about four hundred and seventy-five (475) casualties were evacuated in LVT's from Red Beach Two on D-DAY plus 2. The U.S.S. DOYEN Beach Party relieved our Beach Party at about

-11-

XII.

U.S.S. SHERIDAN

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

BEACH PARTY (Medical Section): (cont'd)

100 on D-DAY plus 2. When we returned to the ship leaving behind all utilizable medical supplies and arriving aboard about noon. In the course of the operation there were two casualties to our own personnel.

2. It is humanly impossible to adequately treat so large a number of casualties brought abcard in so short a time with the number of medical personnel this ship had on board. The types of injuries seen abcard this ship were due to artillery and mortar fire which caused many large mutiliating destructive wounds. We should have fifty (50) additional corpsmen for such type of operation. If the casualties could be brought on board in smaller groups, they could receive better treatment.

XIII. DAMAGE CONTROL:

1. Extensive instruction periods and drills in Damage Control were held daily. After each damage control problem a discussion was held in which all members of Damage Control Parties participated. A record of problems is kept on file. Several movies on the chemistry of fire and techniques of fire fighting were shown to all members of crew. All members of Damage Control Parties have received individual instruction in the use of all Damage Comtrol appliances. On 14 June 1944 a test of the firemains was conducted during which sixteen (16) 2¹/₂" fire hoses were on the line at one time. An average pressure of seventy-five (75) pounds was maintained with all the fire hoses on this line.

XIV. OPERATION OF LANDING CRAFT:

 The following report and acounts covering the operation of landing craft was submitted to me, and is as follows:

2. Lieutenant John E. Fletcher, Boat Group Commander, stationed aboard the LCC 39045, functioned off Red Beach on Saipan from D-Day until D plus 8 Day. Initially he was associated with Red Beach 2, on which LT2/6 was landed in assualt. Following the departure of the PC(S) 1079 on D plus 2 day, his functions were extended to cover both Red Beaches until he was relieved on D plus 8 Day.

-12-

U.S.S. SHERIDAN

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

OPERATION OF LANDING CRAFT: (cont'd)

3. The forming of the assault waves on D-DAY was effected without incident. The Control Vessel was on station well in advance of the arrival of the LST's and ample time was allowed for the LCC's to take position before the first tractors arrived. The LST 31 had an LVT(A) caught in her ramp and this delayed the left half of the first and second waves for about thirty minutes, but they arrived at the Line of Departure in time to have all waves perfectly formed before the first wave was dispatched. H-Hour was delayed ten minutes.

During the run from the Line of Departure to the ·4. reef, the speed was gauged by the speed of which the LVT(A)'s were capable. They reached the reef several hundred yards in advance of the first wave- on Red 3 and Green 1. Mortar fire and artillery fire were very heavy as we approached the reef. After having steered a gyro course from the Line of Departure, he observed that the left flank of Red 2 had been buoyed, apparently by the Underwater Demolition Team which had made a reconnaissance of the beaches prior to our arrival, and he kept station on this buoy during the landing of the four assault waves. It was difficult to observe the pattern followed by the LVT's after they crossed the reef, but he could tell that they were giving way to the left, apparently be-cause of pressure from waves on Red 3. His best estimate is that LT2/6 landed half on Red 1 and half on Red 2, and LT3/6 landed half on Red 2 and half on Red 3, and that there was a considerable gap between the right flank of CT6 and the left flank of CT8. Later reports indicated that Red 3 was heavily mined and defended, which might account for the shift in direction after crossing the reef. The first wave landed at H plus 5, the second at H plus 9, the third at H plus 14, and the fourth at H plus 19. Of the 50 LVT's which carried personnel, 48 made it to the beach. One turned over in the surf, which was much heavier than hydrographic reports had indicated, and one received a direct hit by mortar fire. All LVT(A)'s reached the beach, but he could see many of them knocked out before they had a chance to leave the beach and work their way inland. It was also observed that vegetation was more dense than anticipated, and neither the LVT(A)'s nor the LVT(2)'s could move around with any degree of freedom.

5. The LVT Transfer Area was set up initially only about three hundred yards off the roef. Between 25 and 30 tractors returned from the assault waves, and they were gathered together and held for transfer of reserve elements. Mortar and

-13-

U.S.S. SHERIDAN c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

XIV. OPERATION OF LANDING CRAFT: (cont'd)

artillery fire drove us further away, however, and his final station was halfway between the reef and the Line of Departure: Many of the LVT's which came back carried untreated casualties, so the Beach Party Medical Section began treating and evacuating wounded. It was found to be illogical for them to function from the Salvage Boat, which was needed for LVT repair, so Guide Boats were used, and the Medical Section would fill a Guide Boat with casualties, treat them, and send that boat to the LST 218 while they operated from another. This proved satisfactory, but it utilized almost half of the Guide Boats assigned to Red 2.

6. At about M plus 60 he was approached by the Commanding Officer of LT 1/6, embarked on LST's 120 and 131, asking if he had wave Guides for his troops. It was his understanding that Wave Guides had already been supplied, and that their organization was complete, but no LCVP's were with them at all. He was completely unfamiliar with the wave organization, and since they approached in column, four columns abreast, with the first three tractors in each column belonging to the first wave, it was difficult to form them properly. Their tactical unity was badly disrupted, but they did land quickly and on the proper beach. H-Hour had been at 0940, and by 1100 there were two battalions - 2/6 and 1/6 - on Beach Red 2.

7. Beginning at 1100, many LCVP's loaded with priority cargo and special personnel were sent to transfer area, and they were transferred and landed without incident. Shortly after noon, Shore Party Team "2 was sent in for transfer. They required 24 LVT's and their original orders were to land on Red 2. During the transfer, however, orders were received from REDEYE (Control Vessel off Red Beach) to land them on Red 3. This seemed wrong, since all traffic had been diverted from that beach, so he called for him to verify and authenticate. The orders still called for taking the Shore Party to Red 3, so they were landed there, although he learned that as soon as they had landed, they made their way to Red 2 before commencing operations.

8. When the time came to transfer and land the reserve regiment, he had only 6 LVT's in his pool. All tractors from Red 3 were sent to him, sufficient to form the first two waves of LT 3/2, and they were landed on Red 2. As LVT's returned from the beach, they were utilized for subsequent waves. It was a fairly slow process, but before darkness on D-Day we had transferred and landed all of LT 3/2 and half of LT 2/2, as well as Headquarters from CT6.

-14-

U.S.S. SIERIDAN

£

C-O-N-F-I-D-Z-N-T-I-A-L:

c/o Flect Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHIRIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

XIV. OPERATION OF LANDING CRAFT: (cont'd)

9. By this time at least eight LVT's had turned over in the heavy surf, and tractor casualties had been heavy on the beach. At dusk, he warsordered to cease transferring troops, and to have the Wave Guides lead all LVT's to the nearest LST for the night. Their orders were to fuel, be repaired, and have a lead of priority cargo on board in time to report back to him by first light in the morning. Wave Guides were secured except for those still working casualties, and preparations were made to repel possible counter-attack from Garapan. The un-transferred half of LT 2/2 and Headquarters for CT2 were sent to rendezvous at the Control Vessel for the night.

10. The morning of D plus 1 Day found all operable tractors from the 2nd Amphibious Tractor Battalion loaded with cargo, so the further transfer of troops had to wait until they were unloaded. Before noon he had completed the landing of LT 2/2, Hoadquarters for CT 2, Division Headquarters; and two more Shore Party teams, all of them destined for Red 2. This made a total of almost 5000 men who had been landed on this beach within 36 hours. More than 200 casualties were handled in the area, and cargo was sent to the beach as fast as it was sent to him by the Control Vessel.

11. This fundamentally completed the second phase of his work - the assault was completed, and the transforring was completed, and our problem new became one of unloading. Initially he was working LST's in our vicinity carrying priority cargo, but he also took care of all LCVP's and LCM's whose cargo was transferable.

12. After the second night, LVT's wore kept on the beach rather than returning to LST's. It was only through their organization and discipline that the flow of supplies was maintainod. Each morning a critical shortage of some items existed, and he was able to fill the need through tractor shuttle trips. He had between 30 and 40 LVT's working for 55% at this point, this pool representing the total number of operable LVT's remaining from the assault waves on both Rod beaches.

13. Then the Underwater Domolition Team opened a channel to Red baaches on D plus 4 Day, a new system was inaugurated. The channel could accommodate only one-way traffic, and was not usable for a five hour period at low tide, although as many as 2000 boats were sent through the channel on a single tide. During high tide, while boats could get through, LVT's

-15-

U.S.S. SHERIDAN

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of

XIV. OPERATION OF LANDING CRAFT: (cont'd)

were utilized to get supplies to the advance dumps and the front lines. When the tide was out, however, the LVT's were made available to him for transfer outside of the reef, and all cargo that could be worked by hand was transferred into LVT's at low tide. This system was in effect when he was relieved by Lt. (jg) Holland from the MIDDLETON, and was satisfactory for handling the flow of traffic existing at that time.

COMENTS

1. The basic plan was near-perfect from a control point of view. Through having complete units in separate LST's, through having the LST's close to the Line of Departure, through having wave Guides who were familiar with the over-all plan and could brief tractor personnel, through having a fixed point at the Line of Deperture, most of the errors of Tarawa and Kwajalein were eliminated.

2. It is felt that too many of our LVT's on D-DAY were tied up with Shor Harty and with cargo from the floating dump. By the time the reserve regiment was committed, an adequate supply of LVT's was not available

3. The thing which contributed most to whatever success he had in the handling of LVT's was having on his LCC an officer representing the various tractor units involved. Through them, during all three phases of the operation, a liaison was maintained which brought about perfect coordination of effort. He had the executive officer of the 2nd AmTracBn and a company commander of B Co., 5th AmTracBn, and both of them stayed with him for the first three days.

4. The system for transferring troops into LVT's is not so important as having an adequate number on hand. Once an LOVP is alongside an LVT, the transfer can be accomplished in two or three minutes. Noward the end of the transfer part of the operation, as things became more chaotic, he used a system in which a pool of tractors was formed, without any effort to organize a wave or control a specific number. When enough LVT's were there to handle the next wave to be transferred, the boats merely moved in among the tractors in the pool, transferred into any empty tractor, and moved out again. Then all loaded LVT's formed behind a wave guide who led them out of the pool and across the boat lane for Red 2, where they jockeyed for position before making the run to the beach.

(16)

U.S.S. SHERIDAN

O-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:

c/o Fleet Fost Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject:

U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN OPERATION - REPORT of .

IIV. OPERATION OF LANDING CRAFT: (cont'd)

5. Boats carrying cargo to be worked by hand into LVT's should carry several extra men as a working party. In this operation the greater part of the cargo handling was done by the boat crews and the tractor crews without assistance.

6. The cargo unloading ticket did not sorve its purpose on this operation, for a variety of reasons. There were many ships who failed to use them, particularly in the general unloading phase. There was a tendency to mark all loads Priority and to have each beat fly the PETER flag, even if the beat had dunnage or organizational gear or K rations. Then, too, many corswains failed to give their tickets to the LVT drivers, or were bewildered when they were faced by the necessity of transferring their load into two different LVT's. LVT's carried the cargo straight to the dumps, without leaving their tickets with the Beach or Shore Party. In addition, the absence of REDEVE caused some confusion as to who was supposed to receive and check the slips; in theory, GREENEVE was supposed to take over the functions of REDEVE, but actually boats were not stopped until they came to the LCC off Red Beaches. It is folt that the use of cargo unloading tickets is very valuable during the "On Call" phase of the operation, but that after general unloading begins, it loses its value.

7. Too many ships wore trying to unload on the same boach. During the general unloading of Transport Divisions 18 and 28, there were 8 ships which marked their tickets for Red 2, while almost no traffic was directed to Green Beaches. It becaue necessary to divert more than 50% of the beats to a destination other than the one originally intended, in an effort to equalize the lead.

8. In their haste to get boats unleaded, some ships sent far too many boat officers out "to see that their boats were handled properly and unleaded immediately and returned to the ship". Such officers tend to export special consideration from these in control, and cause more confusion than they eliminate. The ships would get unleaded faster if they used these boats for cargo rather than officers.

9. It is urgently recommended that all beats be provisioned and equipped before they go over the side on D-Day to take care of possible emergencies which might arise. In addition to the regular gear required in a beat, there should be a hemmeok and a ponche and a blanket for each man, and sufficient food and water for

(17)

U.S.S. SHERIDAN

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN OPERATION - REPORT of .

XIV.

OPERATION OF LANDING CRAFT: (cont'd)

the boat crew to live in the boat for a week or more without receiving anything other than water and fuel. We provisioned our boats with canned juices, meats, crackers, spreads, fruits, etc., so that the feeding problem for boat crews would not be so acute.

10. The uso of certain IST's for hospital ships did not seem to be as effective as planned. Casualtics were handled badly when boats came alongside, and the time interval was too great between wound and treatment. It seems more advisable to run ICVP's direct to transports if possible, but to have certain IST'S equipped to handle casualties when transports leave the area.

11. Outstanding performances, which contributed materially to the success of the operation, were noted as follows:

(a) Major Lawrence, Major Durand, Captain Tenney, and Captain Nygren, of the 2nd Amphibious Tractor Battalion, and Captain Cram, "B" Company, 5th Amphibious Tractor Battalion, and all their men were heroic and tircless in their efforts in the initial landing and subsequent operations off Red Beaches. Theirs was a magnificent performance; without them, we would have been driven back off the beaches.

(b) Lt. Condr. Kauffman and the men of Underwater Demolition Team #5, made and maintained a 260 yard channel through the reef between Red 2 and Red 3. Faced with sceming failure, they came back and opened the channel, and kept it open and bucyed day and night so beat traffic could flow - ugh to Red and Green beaches. It is estimated that nearly a thousand beats passed through this channel before nightfall on D plus 8 Day.

(c) Ens. Andres, Ens. Jones, and the mon of LCC 39045 (USS ELECTRA) aided in the working of Red Beach by their cooperation and initiative and obedience to orders.

(d) The Salvago Boats and Salvage Officers off Red Beaches (Ens. Slinkman from BOLIVAR in PA34-14, Lt. (jg) Fenton, and Lt. (jg) Norberg from SHERIDAN in PA51-9 contributed an outstanding performance of duty in the face of enemy fire.

(e) Lt. (jg) Clark, from the USS BOLIVAR, as a Wave Guide for Red 3, used great initiative and sound judgment in the handling of LVT's.

(18)

U.S.S. SHERIDAN

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, Galifornia 25 June 1944

Subject:

XIV.

U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN OPERATION - REPORT OF

OPERATION OF LANDING CRAFT: (cont'd)

(f) Vaughn, BM2c, Molson, SM3c; and the crow of PA51-10, were invaluable in the control of channel traffic and in salvage and rescue work.

(g) All boat crews of all ships worked day and night for eight days in order that the operation might be a success. Operating under the most trying of circumstances, they unloaded the ships rapidly and handled their beats with skill and intelligence. In the entire eight days, there was not a single act of disobedience or misjudgment observed by him arong all the beats with which I had contact.

(h) The DOYEN Gas Boats (PA1-8 and PA1-12) were outstanding in their performance of duty during a prolonged peried. They actually went among the IVE's begging them to take gas, were tireless in their efforts, and kept the tractors running during the crucial hours when LVT traffic was the only traffic to the beach.

(i) Ens. Jamicson, Ens. Bock, Ens. Sumborg, Ens. Thomasson; Ens. Papinoau, and Bos'n Haynic, all from the USS SHERIDAN, woro tireless and valuable in their performance of duty under enemy fire.

XV. SALVAGE BOAT:

1. Report of activities as Salvage Officer on Beach Red 2 during Salpan operation. An LCP(%), number PA51-9 was equipped as salvage boat and carried its regular crew in addition to Cpl. Nick Esposito, USMC, or LVT maintecance expert.

2. We arrived at the Line of Departure at 0700 on D-DAY and assisted in forming the assault waves. The Salvage Boat then followed the first wave in to within about seventy-five (75) yards of the reef. After the four assault waves had landed the LVT's began coming back to the LCC for Red Beach 2 which had taken station on the left flank on the beach. Some of there vehicles were damaged and others were in need of minor repairs and we immediately began servicing these vehicles and continued this work throughout the most of the day. Some of the LVT's had bullet holes in the pontoons. Although this is not of a serious nature it allows the pontoon to fill with water and makes it very difficult to steer the LVT. Wooden plugs were placed in these holes on approximately fifteen (15) LVT's. About the same number required minor motor

-194 %

U.S.S. SHERIDAN c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

XV. SALVAGE BOAT: (cont'd)

ropairs or adjustments and 6 or 7 which could not be repaired on the spot were towed back to an LST repair ship.

During this time the Medical Beach Party Officer of this vessel with four (4) corpsmen was rendering first aid medical attention to wounded returning from the beach. We assisted him wherever we could but devoted our attention primarily to salvage work. During the afternoon a LVT overturned on the reef on the right flank of Red Beach Two, and we were directed to assist them and were able to rescue twenty (20) men on the reef.

4. During the next day, D plus 1, we assisted Lieut. Fletcher, Traffic Control Officer on Red Beach Two, whenever possible in transfer of cargo from LCVP's to LVT's. During the afternoon we were called in to the lagoon off Red Beach Two; to assist in controlling boat traffic off Red Beach Two; but there was very little traffic when we arrived. The next day, D plus 2, a channel was blasted through the reef off Red Beach Two; which allowed boat traffic to pass in to the lagoon at high tide and we returned to the lagoon to control boat traffic. I was relieved by Lt (jg) N.S. Norburg on the morning of D plus 2 day and returned to the ship. On D plus 5 day I returned and relieved Lt (jg) Norburg. During this day and the following we acted as traffic control vessel inside the lagoon off Red Beach Two. On the morning of D plus 7 day I was relieved by Lt (jg) Mart of the PA 11.

5. Concerning our salvage activities during this operation we assisted in salvaging one LCVP which had a hole in the stern and was sinking and retracted one other LCVP off the beach. Practically all our salvage work had to do with LVT's. It is believed that the plan of having a LVT maintenance man in the salvage boat is an excellent one. Cpl. Esposito was thoroughly familiar with his work and appeared to be a very competent mechanic, as a cousequence very few LVT's were out of commission at any one time on Red 2 because of mechanical failures.

6. It is felt that an LCP(L) which we used is admirably suited for salvage of LCVP's and LCM's and for retracting them from the beach when they are , and also for salvage of LVT's. However, there is a tendency to load down the LCP(L) with all types of heavy salvage and repair gear such as welding outfits, underwater diving equipment and etc. The salvage boat should be nighly mobile and used only for temporary emergency repairs. Vehicles which require additional repairs can be towed to a repair ship or in the

-20-

U.S.S. SHERIDAN

C-O-N-F-L-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:

c/o Floet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SHERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

\$

XV. SALVAGE BOAT: (cont'd)

care of LVT's can be sent in to the beach as soon as a LVT maintonance unit is set up ashore.

7. In addition to the outstanding work of Cpl. Esposito which has been mentioned, I wish to commond the work of R.C. Hurley, Coxswain, A. Abrou, Sic and Robert Garvin MoMMic. Those men constitute an exceptionally capable salvage crew. They have been under fire bofore and in each case have done outstanding work.

XVI. PERSONNEL:

1. Every department functioned well through the entire operation. No lack of attention to duty by any officer or man was observed or brought to my attention. Each officer performed his duties tirelessly and with skill and understanding.

2. Based on verbal reports and other sources of information available to the Commanding Officer, it is my opinion that the Boat Group Commander, Wave Commanders, Boach Party officers, and all enlisted personnel in boats or on the beach handled their duties courageously and skillfully.

3. The Medical Department did an outstanding job of handling large numbers of casualties when they were brought aboard from the LST and other boats.

XVII. REMARKS:

1. There were many changes in loading of cargo after final plans were made. It is understood that these changes must be approved by the Commanding Officer, troops and the Commanding Officer of the ship and in order to expedite and carry all cargo possible for the success of the operation, it is usually approved. It is this command's opinion that some of these changes could have been avoided had the units put more thought in the earlier stages of planning.

-21-

U.S.S. SHERIDAN

21

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 25 June 1944

Subject: U.S.S. SIERIDAN - SAIPAN Operation - Report of.

XVII. REMARKS: (cont'd)

2. Several units were embarked after the loading was completed and that had not been planned for. These units had considerable cargo to be embarked. In order to accommodate this cargo, part of a well loading plan was broken up, necessitating re-opening of hatches after being secured for sea, too much deck space had to be used and some of the valuable equipment had to be stored inadequately. No prior notice had been received by this ship, on the embarkation of these units until it was too late.

3. As the proparation of loading plans take four or five days with the forces afloat, it is believed, loading plans could remain as originally planned, and in the event of any changes, an annex could be appended.

4. The wounded brought aboard had much of there clothed ing destroyed tending their wounds, and were left with no clothing, when some were able to get up and around. It is suggested that 200 pairs of dungarces, 2/3s modium size and 1/3 large size, be put aboard each ship that will receive casualties; plus 400 pairs of underwear with the same proportion of sizes. This forethought would insure that the wounded that could get up and around would be properly clothed. The Transport Quartermaster of the ship could store this clothing and issue it, as called for.

22

co: TransDiv 28 V TransGroup ABLE AdminComFIFTHPhibForPac ComFIFTHPhibForPac CinCpac CenPac


	340		- 0.HA R		HH HH	H HS HH
	5 	338	Elich	85	(E) (E)	15
	Shore Party	D-Tanks	let Plat Wpns 6	Mpns 6	<u>155</u> Вл (Пом)	(Årty)
	Personnel and gear Naval Flatoon less advance element.	4 Light Tanks	4 - 37nm's & personnel (200 rds per gun)	4 - 75 SF's (Half- Tracks with ‡ ton trailer, Ammo) 1 - TCS Jeep & Personnel	Personnel	Personnel
222235	-	87¥33 X3	2020	S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S	545	848888
	LCVP)	(LOH)	(LCVP)	(LOM)	(LCVP)	(avar)
	9 - LCVP	4 - 10M	4 - LCVP	4 (LCM) 1 (LCVF)	3 - LCVP	8 - idyp
	To be boated and sent to Control Vessel, arriving not later than H plus one hour.	Boated and sent to LSD -6 (LINDENWALD) as soon as possible	Join LOM wave, serial #605 and report to LSD -7 (OAKHIIL)	To be boated as soon as possible and sent to join medium tanks at LSD = 7 (OAKHILL)	To be boated and sent to AKA's A, 7, and 9 upon arrival in	To be boated and sent to LST 246 immediately upon arrival in terget area


	* - Bro		Mone U					640 - nwi, 2/6	-
	Broken down boxes or cloverleafs.	20 2 gal, cans 50 cetane, cormercial 15 cylinders, nitro- gen 5 cylinder, hydrogen, - 1 service kit. (Flame Thrower)	U U	AP Clvrlde, 75mm G	3) GUNTLIN, 75mm G AP 30 " 75mm G MP 100 " * Elmin MA3A11 15 Boxes, Grenades, hund, frag.	A DECEMBER OF THE OWNER		Fersonnel	
	overleafs.	Ploating Dump	Floating Dump	Floating Dump	Ploating Dump	Ploating Dump	37 (LCVP)	38 (LCVP)	BOAT
		1 - LCVP	1 - LCVP	1 - LCVP	1 - LCVP	1 - LOVP	1 - LCVP	1 - LCVP	BONT
		Same as above.	Same as above.	Same as above.	Same as above.	Load as soon as possible and dis- patch to RED Beach Control Vessel.	Boated as soon as possible and send to Control Vessel.	Boated as soon as possible and send to Control Vessel.	ACTION REQUIRED OF
S (()		Same as above.	Same as above.	Same as above.	LCVP sent from AK44 (ELEC TR)				-

A STATE OF A

	337	339	None	394	150 (e)	(e) 250	£	None	606	NO.
	Hdq.JASCO	₩P co.	726 Air Warn.	ki- warn. Squad #5	155 Bn (How)	155 Bn (How)	4/10 (Arty)	SP Team /2	2nd Prov. HocketDet.	UNIT
	Personnel	Personnel	2 - 22 ton trucks 2 - 1 ton trailers 1 Jeep & personnel	Jeep, trailer, 6 carts, and personnel	Carts and personnel	TCS Jeep, carts, & personnel, (recon- naissance).	8 - TCS Jeeps, & personnel	1 armored dozer & driver.	2-l ton rocket trucks & personnel	CONTAINING
	64 (LCVP)	63 (LCVP)	58 (LGM) 59 " 60 (LGVP) 61 "	56 (LCM)	49 (LCVP) 50 " 51 "	43 (LOVP)	29 (LGVP) 30 31 32 33 34 34 34 34 34	None	13 (LOM) 14 "	BOAT
	1 LCVP	1 LCVP	2 LOM 3 LCVP	2 LOM	3 LCVP	6 LCWP	8 LOND	1 LOM	2 LON	BOAT HEO.
	On call.	0n 0311	On Gall.	On call.	On call.	On call,	0n call	Load at 2nd trip of LCM's, to HED Control Vessel.	Load in first available LCM's on 2nd trip of boats, to ABED Cont. Ves.	ACTION REQUIRED OF
5 1 m				Use LCVP's if more prac- ticable.				ford same time as rocket. trucks.		CONCENTS

A STATISTICS AND A SUBRIA STA





1. 4 A.

Target Area

LCP(L) #10 to PC1461, to serve as tender for Red Beach Control. LCP(L) #9 to BOLIVAR, to serve as salvage boat for Red Beach 2.

Rail

Load 3

- LCVP's for Shore Party.
 LCVP's for 4/10, to be embarked on LST 246.
 LCVP's for 155 How Bn, to be embarked on KA's 4, 7, and 9. 4 - LCVP's for 37mm's, to go with 75SP's to tank circle,

 - LCVF for D-Med, to go to Control Vessel, Red Beach.
 LCVF for Bn4, to go with D-Med to Control Vessel.
 LCVF to go with 75SP's.
 LCVF for floating dump, Red Beach.


Total 26 LCVP's (Remaining are 2 LCVP's for smoke boats)

- 4 LCLI's for 75SP's, go to tank circle, Red Beach. (LSD-7).
- LCM's for light tanks, go to tank circle, Green Beach. (LSD-6).

In addition, load 4 ELECTRA LCVT's for floating dump. They will send their boats for this purpose.

We receive:

- 4 LCVP's from DOYEN. 1 LCM's from COMET. 2 LCM from WARHAWK.
- 2 LCM's from ELECTRA. 1 LCM from



TROOPS ABOARD AFA-51 AT PEARL HARBOR LT 2/6

~~, U

· · · ·

31 May 1944

UNIT	US			USIN	的方法的影响	
	0	WO	ENL	0	WO	ENL
Hq-2-6	9	0	38	0	0	0
E+2-6	1	0	19	0	0	0
F-2-6	1	0	23	0	0	0
0-2-6	1	0	4	0	0	0
H&S 6thMarines	0	0	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	0	0
Wpns, 6thMarines	3	0	97	0	0	2
726th Air Marning Co.	- 4	0	63	0		0
2d JASCO, Hq Det	0	0	10	0		0
2d MP Co.	3	0	21	0	0	0
Ship's Plat #8	0	2	81	0	0	0
155MM How Bn	11	1	204	1	0	3
L-10thMarines	2	0	0	0	0	0
3-1-18thMarines	0	0	2	0	0-	0
CasCo, 2dMarDiv, (TOM)	1	0	0	0		0
-2-Med	0	0	1	0	0	0
GLT	1	0	5	0	0	0
arine Corps Schools	1	0	0	0	0	0
BCP	1	0	111	-	0	0
-10thMarines	17	1	223	0	0	5
-Tanks, 2dPlatoon	1	٥	27	0	0	0
hore Party	8	0	245	0	.	4
&S-V AC	22	1	55	0	0	0
ir Warning Squadron #5	3	0	59	0	.	- 1
orps Artillery, V AC	0	0	0	2	0	σ
Q&HQ, USA	2	0	3	0	0	0
ivil Affairs, USA-APO-244	0	0	0	8	0	10
	11/03/2012/02/1	the shall in	and the second second	MUSIC AN	Della Maria	AL 201000

-1-

Enclosure (B)

29

ñ


22	Tithe	1011
6 FG .	June	1944

Ó


CARGO REPORT

HI HATCH NUMBER OF LIFTS OF CARGO	
ESTIMATED TIME OF DISCHARGE 40 hours	8
#2 HATCH NUMBER OF LIFTS OF CARGO228	
ESTIMATED TIME OF DISCHARGE 46 hours	8
#3 HATCH NUMBER OF LIFTS OF CARGO 59	
ESTIMATED TIME OF DISCHARGE 38 hours	
NUMBER OF LIFTS OF CARGO	
ESTIMATED THE OF DISCHARGE 43 hours	3

-2- Enclosure (B). 30



w



28 June 1944

From: The Executive Officer. To : The Commanding Officer:

Subject:

Landing Operations on Saipan Island, Marianas, 15 June to 21 June 1944 - comments on.

1. Our participation in this action consisted principally in guiding the assault wave of Landing Team 2/6, 2nd Marine Division, embarked on LST's with our boat officers and our radiomen, who had been transferred to those same LST's at the forward staging area, Eniwetok, and further debarking and landing remaining elements on board of Landing Team 2/6 with all their equipment and supplies. In addition to the above we had on board a number of special groups, equipment and staff, Air Warning, Civil Affairs, etc., not attached to Landing Team 2/6 and subject to call.

2. The assault landing and the subsequent landing of all remaining elements on board scheduled for landing "on time", or "on call", was accomplished as scheduled, or as called for. The beach on which our team landed was controlled by Boat Group Commander, Lieut. J.E. FLETCHER, and he was assisted by our Assistant Boat Commander, Lt(j.g.) E.C. FENTON, as this ship's salvage boat. They remained there during the entire time we were in the area and were still there when this ship sailed.

3. Our Beach Farty landed on D-Day and began to function immediately though under fire constantly, and was relieved D plus 2 Day, meantime suffering casualties; two dead, six wounded, including. our beach master Lieut. W.P. DICKSON, Jr.,

4. The entire operation was one of hard careful work and attention to detail, interrupted by sortie and by lack of boats at times, due to the inability of boats to land and be unloaded. I would not know how to single out any particular officer or man during this operation for particular mention, each in his own assigned duty did his job well. Based upon verbal reports and the best information available to me, it is my opinion that the Boat Group Commanders, Wave Commanders,

(1)

33

×₹.

Subject: Landing Operations on Saipan Island, Marianas, 15 June to 21 June 1944 - comments on.

Beach Party officers, and all enlisted personnel in boats or ' on the beach handled their duties courageously and skillfully, and I am proud of them.

5. The Medical Department did an outstanding job of handling large numbers of casualties when they were brought aboard from an LST and other running boats. A great many volunteers assisted that department as they could be spared from other duties.

6. Every department functioned well through this operation. I am glad to report that not a single instance of lack of attention to duty by any officer or man was observed by me or brought to my attention. On the other hand, the energy with which officers and men of this command applied themselves in the performance of their duties was done tirelessly and with skill and understanding.

R.M. INGRAM

Enclosure (D)

行 相同的情報

(2)